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BOOK REVIEWS 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J.* 
JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. By MIECZYSLAW MANELI. 
New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1981,406 pp., $24.95, cloth. 
The legal and philosophical problem of human rights has been a controversial 
issue in international law. In the 150 years before World War II, international 
law was not concerned with human rights. Only the sovereign states had legal 
rights and duties in the international context. The individual person was merely 
an object of international law; he enjoyed no rights and had no duties. A nation's 
treatment of its own nationals, no matter how heinous, was not the concern of 
international law. 
Recent jurisprudence is more active in seeking to protect human rights. To 
provide the analytic framework for a new attitude, legal theory has had to 
develop accordingly. Natural law has been the primary vehicle of this develop-
ment; it stands in sharp contrast to juridical positivism, the so-called tool of 
tyrants. Mieczyslaw Maneli, in his new book Juridical Positivism and Human Rights, 
re-assesses the popularly held notion concerning juridical positivism and argues 
that his theory affords the best protection for human rights in today's interna-
tional society. Professor Maneli I adds a unique perspective on the role of juridi-
cal positivism and the protection of human rights in various modern societies. 
The traditional absolutist notion of the state, where the state could treat its 
citizens "according to discretion,"2 originated in the theories of Georg Hegel, the 
German philosopher. According to the Hegelian theory, the state is a moral 
person which is superimposed upon the individual members of a political soci-
ety. As a person the state exercises supreme power for itself by its own natural, 
inalienable right; it is sovereign. This theory results, finally, in the state substitut-
* Father Nicholson is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School; S.].. B.A., M.A., Boston 
College; S.T.L. Weston College; LL.B., LL.M., Georgetown University; LL.M., SJ.D., Harvard Univer-
sity. 
I. Professor Maneli was Professor of Law and held the chair of History of Political and Juridical 
Doctrines at Warsaw University in Poland. After he lost that academic position during the anti-liberal 
purges of 1968, Professor Maneli left Poland and assumed his present position at Queens College. 
2. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955). 
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ing itself for the people to the detriment of the people, as the totalitarian states of 
this century have clearly demonstrated. 
Professor Maneli discusses the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic as it has operated in 
the Soviet Union and in Communist Poland. According to the Communist 
Manifesto "law is the will of the ruling class,"3 serving the interests and purposes 
of this class. Law is an instrument of the class struggle. Thus, according to this 
theory, no legal rules which serve all the people or all of mankind can exist. The 
terrible excesses of the Stalin period directly followed this idea. The extermina-
tion of the kulaks, the establishment of a terroristic police force, and the "show 
trials" under Vyshinsky during the late 1930's were the product of the Soviet 
Union's brand of state absolutism. 
After Stalin's death in 1953, the long process of de-Stalinization began. Maneli 
points out that this change had an impact on socialist law in the Soviet Union and 
in other socialist countries. Gradually a "liberal Communist view of Socialist 
legality"4 appeared in Poland and in other countries in the Soviet bloc. This new 
legality stressed that no justice could exist without legal procedures to protect the 
individual from governmental and administrative abuses. When one recalls the 
Russian intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, one 
wonders about the reality of these new secure individual liberties. The current 
crackdown on the Solidarity Union in Poland by the Polish government does 
nothing to remove that doubt. The question remains: can any legal philosophy 
which gives pre-eminence to government and positive law, the law as it "is," 
guarantee human rights? This is the focus of the perennial controversy between 
those who support the law as it "is" and those who opt for the law as it "ought to 
be"; between the juridical positivists and the supporters of natural law. 
Professor Maneli argues that only the theory of juridical or legal positivism can 
preserve individual rights and liberties. He concedes that juridical positivism is 
not the favored philosophy of modern thinking. Opponents have criticized 
juridical positivism as the source of totalitarianism. This criticism has focused 
particularly upon John Austin's "command theory" of the law, a very influential 
version of juridical positivism. Maneli answers that the critics have missed the 
genuine meaning of positivism and have subjected the theory to distortions and 
misinterpretations. He then explains what he calls the true tradition of legal 
positivism and the role it has played in protecting human rights. 
Professor Maneli examines the foundations of modern juridical positivism in 
the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and Rudolf von Ihering. He then presents 
John Austin's ideas of law and sovereignty. Austin's famous work, Lectures on 
Jurisprudence,5 played a major role in establishing legal positivism as the predom-
3. M. MANEU,JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MANEUj. 
4. [d. at 127. 
5. J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAw 179-85 (4th ed. 
1873). 
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inant legal philosophy in the century before World War II. According to Austin, 
laws or rules are a species of commands which oblige persons to obey them. 6 
Laws are ethically neutral; they are based on the power of a superior who can 
impose sanctions and thereby enforce obedience. While individuals in society 
have the duty to obey, the sovereign is not bound by any legal limitations. 
Austin's goal was to provide the basis for predictability, uniformity, and order in 
a political society. His "command theory" of the law can lead to a well-ordered 
state, but it does not guarantee the legal rights of individual persons. Thus, this 
imperative theory of law provides the ideal theoretical framework for a totalita-
rian state. 
Professor Maneli, however, believes that juridical positivism is the best guaran-
tor of human rights. In addressing the issue of the Austinian theory of law and 
totalitarianism, Professor Maneli argues that critics have misinterpreted Austin's 
views. Maneli's analysis of Austin's writings leads him to conclude that Austin 
never meant that the power of the sovereign was to be absolutely unlimited. 
Maneli contends that the principle of utility - the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number - would guarantee a reciprocal relationship between sovereign 
and subject. Whether this unique thesis adequately refutes Austin's critics is open 
to debate. In any case Maneli's thesis does not stand or fall with John Austin. 
Professor Maneli has coined a new expression for his approach to legal 
positivism. He calls it "Positivist Realism." Professor Maneli describes positivist 
realism as a philosophical amalgam of juridical positivism and American realism. 
The realists argued for an experimental approach to the study ofthe legal order 
and a skeptical attitude toward traditional legal rules. They demanded that 
greater attention be given to the purposes of law and its actual operation in 
society.7 Maneli discusses the writings of Holmes, Arnold, and Llewellyn, and 
contends that realism added a new, liberalizing dimension to legal positivism. He 
suggests that classical legal positivism was, perhaps, too narrowly concerned with 
legal rules or the law as it "is." Alternatively, positivist realism is free from that 
danger because it departs from a dogmatic, schematic cast of mind and tends 
towards a cast of mind which is more flexible, modern and based on experience. 
The realists certainly made an impact on legal thinking and institutions in the 
United States. They were particularly prominent during the 1930's and 1940's. 
Now, however, the realist school of legal thought is much less vital. Some realists 
displayed a skeptical and iconoclastic attitude toward precedent and principle 
which revealed a shallow cynicism. Therefore, the usefulness of the realist school 
as a basis for protecting human rights is open to challenge. Maneli's incorpora-
6. [d. at 98. 
7. F. LEBuFFE & J. HAYES. THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 179-85 (5th ed. 1953). Prominent 
American realists included Karl Llewellyn. Thurman Arnold. and Jerome Frank; Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes was the forerunner of the realists and the inspiration for their writings. 
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tion of American realism as an essential part of his legal theory is, therefore, also 
questionable. 
In the past forty years a view that the individual possesses personality in 
international law has gradually developed. The practice of humanitarian inter-
vention, the Genocide Convention,S and the United Nations' Covenant on 
Human Rights9 are evidence of this change. However, the lingering Austinian 
concept of absolute state sovereignty still impedes full recognition of the individ-
ual's standing in international law. Nonetheless, the idea that international law, 
de lege ferenda, now recognizes rights of the individual is rationally defensible. 
The renewed concern for human rights since World War II attests to the 
revival of the natural law as a source of international legal rules. lo The natural 
law postulates that each human being possesses a dignity in himself, something 
he did not get from other human beings. He has certain rights and duties which 
no man has a right to destroy. This bundle of rights and duties makes him sui 
juris. Proponents of natural law argue that the only protection from the human 
degradation sanctioned by the laws of totalitarian states available to individuals is 
to subordinate the state to the individual. Obviously, the natural law position is 
diametrically opposed to juridical positivism's "command theory" of law. Bad 
experiences with the totalitarian state have also driven legal philosophers away 
from legal positivism and back to natural law. 11 A clear example of this trend is 
Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion in the 1966 judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in the South West African Cases: 12 
The principle of the protection of human rights is derived from the 
concept of man as a person and his relationship with society which 
cannot be separated from universal human nature. The existence of 
human rights does not depend on the will of a State; neither inter-
nally on its laws or on any other legislative measure, nor internation-
ally on treaty or custom, in which the express or tacit will of a State 
constitutes the essential element. ... If a law exists independently 
of the will of the States and, accordingly, cannot be abolished or 
modified even by its constitution, because it is deeply rooted in the 
conscience of mankind and of any reasonable man, it may be called 
"natural law" in contrast to "positive law."13 
Professor Maneli takes the position that the theory of juridical or legal 
positivism is the best hope for human rights. Therefore, the fact that he 
8. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 (enf£red into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49-60, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
10. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 310-24 (4th ed. 1960). 
11. [d. 
12. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.]. 6. 
13. [d. at 297-98. 
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downplays the role of natural law, going so far as to characterize it as "the myth 
of natural law"14 is not surprising. This restatement of an old canard is thus a 
disappointment. Today's legal positivists may argue that no need exists to es-
pouse natural law to protect human rights from the sovereign, but the revival of 
natural law thinking is no myth. Professor Maneli's judgment concerning the 
natural law may reveal his East European orientation. The natural law theory 
that the person supersedes the state is not a universally popular view behind the 
Iron Curtain. 
Professor Maneli's thesis of positivist realism is interesting even if not entirely 
acceptable. Juridical Positivism and Human Rights is an important book because it 
provides the American lawyer with an insight into ideas originating in a different 
political environment and tradition. The major contribution of the book is to 
introduce, through Maneli's proposals, East European thought, which is largely 
unknown in the West, to the reader. One of Maneli's proposals is particularly 
revealing: "[T]he decisive question in modern society . . . is. . . how values, 
more or less generally accepted, should be incorporated into the existing positive 
law systems. . . ."15 This concern for common values has a natural law reso-
nance. Professor Maneli may be closer to the natural law than he realizes. This 
would not be surprising since the natural law is the philosophia perennis. 
14. MANELl, supra note 3, at 347. 
15. [d. at 360. 
